Worker flows and establishment wage differentials : a breakdown of the relationship by Duhautois, Richard et al.
Worker flows and establishment wage differentials : a
breakdown of the relationship
Richard Duhautois, Fabrice Gilles, He´lo¨ıse Petit
To cite this version:
Richard Duhautois, Fabrice Gilles, He´lo¨ıse Petit. Worker flows and establishment wage differ-
entials : a breakdown of the relationship. Workshop on job and worker flows, Nov 2012, Kyoto,
Japan. <hal-00833872>
HAL Id: hal-00833872
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00833872
Submitted on 13 Jun 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Workshop on job and worker flows 
15-16 November 2012, Kyoto 
 
 
WORKER FLOWS AND ESTABLISHMENT WAGE DIFFERENTIALS:  
A BREAK DOWN OF THE RELATIONSHIP  
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Abstract – We address the relation between establishment wage differentials and worker 
flows, i.e., the churning rate and the quit rate. Our analysis is based on a linked employer-
employee dataset covering the French private sector from 2002 to 2005. Our estimations 
support the hypothesis that wage premium is an efficient human resource management tool to 
stabilize workers: churning rates are lower in high-paying firms due to lower quit rates. We 
further show that the relation is not linear, and it differs among skill groups and according to 
establishment size: it is strongest for low-wage levels, for low-skilled workers and in large 
establishments. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we address the influence of establishment wage differentials on worker 
flows and job flows. The term worker flows refers to all movements of workers in and out of 
jobs, whereas job flows measures the gross creation and destruction of jobs. Our research 
stands at the junction of two diverse strains of economic literature. The first strain focuses on 
the employer effect on wages. The second strain analyzes job and worker flows. The diffusion 
of matched employer-employee data has enabled the development of both literature fields 
since the 1990s, but the connection between the two has only recently been made. We 
construct a unique data set that links complete establishment-level information on job and 
worker flows with wage information to study in detail the empirical relations between job 
flows, worker flows and wages. Our data concern France between 2002 and 2005. 
Seminal publications by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990, 1992) on gross job flows statistics 
led the way to several analyses in the US and other countries. A sizeable literature has 
developed in the fields of labor and macro economics to measure and explain the various 
statistical and economic relations among the levels of gross job creation and destruction and 
worker flows. Better access to detailed microeconomic data has played a crucial role in this 
movement. One of the main results is the importance of idiosyncratic firm-level 
characteristics in explaining both job and worker flows (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). 
Studying the relative magnitudes of job and worker flows, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000, 
2001) propose the useful notion of “churning flow” as the worker turnover in excess of job 
flows. One main result identified by these authors is that churning is not randomly distributed 
across employers but is highly persistent in particular employers. They consider churning 
profiles as an equilibrium phenomenon that is associated with a particular set of optimal 
personnel policies. The literature yields a series of results regarding the correlation between 
wages and mobility rates.  
In their article, Burgess, Lane and Stevens (2000) use Maryland administrative data (all 
industries, from 1985 to 1994) to show the relationship between hires and separations varies 
with average wages. Similarly, with Finnish data (all industries, 1991 to 1997), Ilmakunnas 
and Maliranta (2007) find that wages explain the churning rates, inflows and outflows. Some 
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studies are directly focused on analyzing the effect of wage levels on mobility.1 For the US, 
authors often focus on the links between fringe benefits and mobility. Reviewing empirical 
literature on the relations between health insurance, labor supply and mobility, Gruber and 
Madrian (2002) conclude that fringe benefits play an important role in job mobility decisions. 
Combining five data sources, Decressin, Hill, McCue and Stinson (2009) construct a 
longitudinal matched employer-employee database over the period 1997-2003.  
In all specifications, they estimate that benefits are negatively related to churning rates in 
the US. Rather, in the European context, compensation schemes are considered as a whole. 
For instance, Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999), using data for Norway (1990, all sectors), find 
that establishment-specific wage premiums have a significant negative impact on excess 
turnover, but this is only true for establishments with at least 25 employees. In a later study, 
Dale-Olsen (2006), still using Norwegian data (1996-1997, all sectors), considers the 
combined influence of fringe benefits and wages on mobility. He concludes that there is a 
relationship between high fringe benefits and high wages and both reduce the worker turnover 
rate. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) use administrative Slovenian data (all business 
sectors, 1997-1999) to show that idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to 
observed patterns of worker and job flows at the firm level. Using Portuguese data (1986 to 
2000, all sectors), Martins (2008) similarly shows that churning is negatively related to 
average wages at the firm level. In a comparative study, Lazear and Shaw (2008) show that a 
negative correlation between worker flows and wage levels is common to the ten OECD 
countries studied. 
Considering the French case, Kramarz and Pérez-Duarte (2008) use a matched employer-
employee dataset from 1977 to 1996 to show that the correlation between the average firm 
wage and exit and entry rates is consistently negative throughout the years studied. Abowd, 
Kramarz and Roux (2006) use a longitudinally linked employer-employee dataset that 
includes complete information about firms and workers for the 1976-1996 period of time. The 
sample is restricted to firms with 200 worker-observations or more so that firm-specific 
mobility and wage process can be estimated. They study the connections among firm-level 
compensation, promotion, retention policies and firm-level performance. Modeling the joint 
                                                 
1
 Note that we focus on establishment effects and therefore exclude studies analyzing the link 
between wage and mobility at the individual level (Farber, 1999, Altonji, Smith and 
Vidangos, 2009). These studies consider the impact of worker wage profile on his/her 
mobility.  
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distribution of these characteristics in the populations of individuals and firms, the authors 
contrast high-wage and low-mobility firms with those that pay low wages and are high-
mobility firms. They infer some hypotheses from their results regarding who initiates the 
separation, but their database does not enable them to test such questions. 
The studies reviewed above all find a strong negative link between mobility and 
compensation. They are grounded on diverse methodologies, and the way in which wages are 
taken into account is particularly unstable. Our study proposes a new definition of an 
establishment’s impact on wages to specify the outline and limits of the relation between 
wage and mobility at the establishment level: do we have a linear relation, and does it hold for 
all types of workers?  
We also question the channel through which the relation runs: do workers in firms paying 
higher wages actually have a lower probability of quitting? The question of who initiates the 
separation has not been addressed in previous analyses of the link between establishment 
wage premium and mobility, even though it emerges as a crucial one in the literature (Abowd, 
Kramarz and Roux, 2006). Some early works focus on quit rates at the industry level and 
show its positive link with industry-level average wages (Stoikov and Raimon, 1968, Burton 
and Parker 1969, Pencavel, 1969). More recently, the question has been raised in management 
literature. Following the exit-voice framework (Hirschman, 1970), some studies try to identify 
the human resource practices favoring voice and lowering the predicted quit rate. Among 
these practices, they point out the negative impact of pay on quit rates (Batt, Colvin and 
Keefe, 2002, Haines, Jalette and Larose, 2010). Yet, these studies consider wage levels as part 
of a set of complementary human resource management (HRM) practices and are based on 
relatively basic definitions of the level of pay2. 
Our database is built as the matching of three different datasets (two administrative 
databases and a survey). Our final sample comprises about 45,000 establishments per year 
with ten employees or more. It links information on workers, their mobility patterns, and 
establishment level characteristics. We have information on each worker inflow or outflow; 
worker and job characteristics are described, as are the legal nature of the movement. We are 
then able to isolate quits among outflows. All of our estimations are run over the entire 
sample and are run separately for different skill groups, enabling us to estimate the link 
between churning rates and pay policy by skill groups. We are then able to follow up on the 
                                                 
2
 Moreover, papers mostly refer to the individual level, linking individual wages to the 
propensity to quit, whereas we focus on the establishment or organizational-level. 
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questions raised in Lane, Salmon and Spletzer (2007) when they showed establishment wage 
differentials are common to all individuals in an establishment. We also differentiate our 
estimations by establishment size, suspecting that wage policy does not have the same 
influence for each establishment size. Throughout our analysis, spline regressions are used to 
investigate for potential nonlinearity.  
Our results support the hypothesis of wage policy as an efficient HRM tool to stabilize 
employees: churning rates are lower in high-paying firms and this is notably due to lower quit 
rates. Our estimations show that the link between establishment wage effects and the churning 
rate is not linear: the negative correlation is particularly strong for establishments in the lower 
quintiles of the wage premium distribution. Moreover, the correlation is stronger for low-
skilled workers and in large establishments. The pattern is similar for the relation between 
establishment wage premium and quit rate, implying that the decision to quit was influenced 
by the employer’s wage policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the data. In Section III, we 
investigate the wage policy issue. Section IV displays the variable definitions and the 
econometric strategy. Section V shows our estimation results. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Variables, definition and measures 
 
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy to estimate the establishment wage 
effects and their link to worker mobility. Our empirical strategy includes two stages: first, 
estimate establishment wage effects, and second, estimate their relationship with labor 
mobility patterns. We will start with a rapid review of the literature on estimating an 
establishment’s impact on wage because the methodology we used in the first stage 
constitutes an original contribution. 
 
1. Estimating an establishment’s impact on wages 
 
Since the 1980s, empirical studies have accumulated evidence that the driving forces 
behind wages include labor demand. Analyzing a firm’s impact on wage started with the 
estimation of industry wage differentials. Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers 
(1988) show a large difference in wages across industries (controlling for individual 
characteristics). Since the 1990s, access to more detailed establishment statistics has opened 
the way to more direct estimation of establishment wage differentials. For instance, Groshen 
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(1991) describes an establishment wage effect based on an analysis of the variance of wages 
(data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Industry Occupational Wage Surveys for six 
manufacturing industries in the mid-1970s). She shows intra-industry wage differentials to be 
almost as large as inter-industry wage variations. With a similar methodology and using more 
recent data (the Bureau of Labor Statistics White Collar Pay Survey for 1989 and 1990), 
Bronars and Famulari (1997) estimate that nearly one fifth of individual wage variation is due 
to establishment wage differentials. More recently, Lane, Salmon and Spletzer (2007) use the 
1996 and 1997 Occupational Employment Statistics to estimate establishment wage 
differentials and their variation among occupations. The key finding of their article is that the 
establishment accounts for about 20% of wage variation without controlling for observable 
employer characteristics, and about 10% after controlling. Kaplan and Pierce (2005) utilize a 
similar method to investigate the question of how establishment wage effects combine at the 
firm level. Controlling for industry and occupation effects, they find that wage levels, but not 
wage changes, are correlated across establishments within a firm. Using a similar 
methodology, Martins (2003) analyzes Portuguese data for the clothing industry over the 
1991-1994 period and show there is a sizeable and persistent dispersion of firm effects. 
In a parallel manner, other studies utilize descriptive statistics to decompose wage 
variance into within and between components. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991), for instance, 
use industry data associated with establishment-level information in the manufacturing 
industries (Longitudinal Research Database) and individual worker information (Current 
Population Survey) over the period 1963-1986. They find that observable establishment 
characteristics more successfully account for inter-industry wage differentials than observable 
worker characteristics. Lazear and Shaw (2008) propose an international comparison with a 
longitudinal perspective on wages. The publication consists of ten national studies referring to 
the structure of wages in the US, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, West-Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Italy. In the first chapter, they use data from all ten 
countries to outline general patterns in wage structure. One of the empirical regularities they 
find is that between-firms variance in wages appears to be increasing over time. In addition to 
obvious differences in skills, the authors argue that these differences in wages are the 
consequence of differences in wage policy. Over the past decades, the existence of 
establishment wage effects has remained as a consistent result of studies based on variance 
analyses.  
Another estimation method used in the literature takes advantage of the panel dimension 
of the data. Using matched person and firm longitudinal data for France over the period 1976-
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1987, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) estimate wages controlling for both observable 
and unobservable heterogeneity in workers and their employing firms. They find that person 
effects are statistically more important than firm effects in explaining compensation and 
performance outcomes. Even though the authors underline that firm effects are second to 
person effects, their study importantly shows that firm effects remain robust despite 
controlling for individual observable and unobservable characteristics. Abowd, Karmarz, 
Margolis (1999) further point out the potential role of assortative matching in understanding 
wage levels. Over the last decade, an empirical literature emerged with the goal of assessing 
the existence and sign of assortative matching in the labor market. Some studies point out a 
small or negative correlation between worker and firm wage effects (Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis, 1999, Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2003). At the industry level, Martins (2004) also 
shows that industry wage differentials are not caused by the over-representation of high-
ability workers. In fact, recent studies mostly insist on the difficulties inherent in the joint 
estimation of person and firm effects on wages. For instance, Woodcock (2008) raises the 
need to estimate a match effect in parallel to firm and worker effects. Mendes, van den Berg 
and Lindeboom (2010) point out the difficulty in identifying assortative matching from wage 
data and turn to productivity estimations. Andrews, Gill, Schank and Upward (2008) show 
that the estimated correlation is biased downwards and this bias is bigger the fewer movers 
there are in the data. In the same vein, Abowd, Kramarz, Pérez-Duarte and Schmutte (2010) 
stress the lack of heterogeneity in the workforce and available jobs undermine the relevance 
of empirical estimation of assortative matching. One needs movers to disentangle firm and 
person effects, which imposes quite strict restrictions on the full use of the data. On a 
theoretical basis, it is also difficult to dissociate what is due to the firm or the individual in 
selection bias (Eeckout and Kircher, 2009). In this context, we choose to focus on estimating 
establishment unobservable characteristics as that establishment’s wage effect, controlling for 
observable individual characteristics. The literature suggests that this may lead to an 
underestimation of establishment wage effects but, at the same time, it enables us to take full 
advantage of the wide scope of our data.  
 
2. First step. Estimating a wage equation 
 
Consider a wage determination model of the form:  
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( ) ittitiit cXbZaWageLog Φ++++= λ , with itiit ε+∆=Φ   (1) 
 
where the subscripts i and t denote establishment and time, respectively. The vector iZ
describes the non-time-varying explanatory variables (industry, region and the legal status of 
the establishment) and itX  the time-varying explanatory variables (establishment size, the 
share of skilled and unskilled workers, the age structure of the labor force, the establishment 
labor productivity, profit and the value-added variation rate). tλ  is a time dummy for each t, 
and itε is an error term with standard properties. i∆  is the establishment fixed-effect.  
 
We define an establishment’s effect on wage as its specific contribution to the total 
variance of wages, i.e., itΦ . itΦ estimates the extent to which an establishment i’s average 
wage at time t differs from what would be expected given its observable characteristics and 
that of its workforce. By construction, we are unable to test what is involved in the 
determination of itΦ . To downplay this problem, we use the panel dimension of our data, i.e., 
we refer to the establishment’s fixed effect i∆  (thereby excluding the yearly error term itε
from itΦ ). Doing so, we make the hypothesis that a given establishment tends to have a stable 
position in the distribution of wage effects. In the next section, we utilize yearly estimations 
of (1) to illustrate the validity of such a hypothesis. 
We use our panel data to run FE-OLS estimation of equation (1) and obtain
wcˆ , the within 
estimates. This is done using the Mundlack (1978) method to take into account the fact that 
we have an unbalanced panel (more than forty percent of establishments only appear in one 
year, whereas 17% of the establishments are followed over the four years). We calculate the 
fixed-establishment effect by the expression: iwii xcwage ˆ)log(ˆ −=∆  where ix is the 
temporal mean of itX . Finally, i∆ˆ  is estimated for every establishment in the sample. In line 
with the literature on an establishment’s impact on wages, our hypothesis is that the 
establishment fixed-effect, i∆ , represents establishment i’s specific influence on wage, its 
wage premium. We refer to an establishment’s persistent effect on wage dispersion as its 
wage policy.  
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3. Questioning the stability of establishment wage effects 
 
Given our longitudinal database, we are able to estimate our wage determination model (1) for 
each year. Using pooled-OLS, we estimate itΦ  as ( ) ( )[ ]itiititit XZWageEWage ,/loglogˆ −=Φ  
and consider it as a proxy for i∆ˆ . Estimates of the temporal mean of itΦˆ  over the four years 
and i∆ˆ  are highly correlated at the establishment level (0.64).  
 
For each establishment, we obtain four estimations of yearly-defined wage effects. We use 
transition matrices to test whether or not the wage policy of the employer varies throughout 
the four year time period. We calculate the following indicator: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tn
kttnkttnkttn
kttP
i
jijiji
i
•
+− +++++
=+
,,,
,
1,,1, for i=j, kt ∀∀ ,  
where ( )kttn ji +,,  is the number of establishments whose itΦˆ  changes from decile i to decile j 
between the years t and t+k, and ( )tni•  is the number of establishments whose itΦˆ  is in the 
decile i at time t. ( )kttPi +,  estimates the share of establishments whose position in the wage 
premium distribution is unchanged (in the same decile) or little changed (in the next or 
previous deciles). Table 1 presents the ( )kttPi +,  value for each decile (i= 1 to 10), for both 
the whole time period and for year-to-year during the period 2002-2005. The table shows that 
the distribution of itΦˆ  is quite stable over time. For instance, 75.1% of the establishments that 
were in the second decile (D2) in 2002 are in the first (D1), in the second (D2) or in the third 
(D3) in 2003. Of course, the ( )kttPi +,  values for the transition between the years 2002 and 
2005 are smaller than yearly probability of transitions. The wage policy of the employer 
evolves slowly, staying quite stable over the 2002-2005 period of time. This stability justifies 
the utilization of the estimated fixed effect i∆ˆ  as a proxy for an establishment’s wage policy 
over this period. 
 
4. Second Step. Estimation of the labor mobility equation  
 
In the second step, we turn to the estimation of labor mobility equations. Consider a labor 
mobility determination model of the form:  
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( ) ittiitiit XZRateLog ελργβα ++∆+++= ˆ                (2) 
 
where itRate  refers either to the churning rate or the quit rate. iZ describes the non-time-
varying explanatory variables and itX  the time-varying explanatory variables, tλ  are time 
dummies and itε  is an error term with standard properties. i∆ˆ  is the estimated wage 
establishment effect. As i∆ˆ does not depend on time ( ρ is our parameter of interest) and there 
are many zeros for each rate, we estimate this equation with Tobit models on the pooled 
sample. 
We also run an alternative estimation method to investigate nonlinearities in the relation 
between the wage premium and mobility ratios. A Spline Regression Model (SRM) breaks the 
regression line into segments, and the regression lines of each segment are joined by knots, 
thus avoiding discontinuity (Marsh and Cormier, 2002). Because we do not know in advance 
the locations of the different knots, we divide the establishment wage policies into quintiles (
1Q , 2Q , 3Q , 4Q ). Thus, we have five segments: 0 to 20%, 20% to 40%, 40% to 60%, 60% to 
80% and 80% to 100%. Equation (2) becomes the following equation (2’): 
( ) ittitiiiiiiit XZRateLog ελγβδρδρδρδρρα ++++++++∆+= 443322110 ˆ   (2’) 
 
where ( )111 ˆ QD ii −∆=δ , ( )222 ˆ QD ii −∆=δ
, 
( )333 ˆ QD ii −∆=δ , ( )444 ˆ QD ii −∆=δ  . 
 
1D , 2D , 3D , 4D  are dummy variables based on the value of i∆ˆ  such that for each 
4,3,2,1=k , 0=kD  when ki Q≤∆ˆ  and 1=kD  when 1ˆ Qk >∆  . By substituting for i1δ , i2δ , 
i3δ  and i4δ , equation (2’) becomes  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )+−∆+−∆+−∆+∆+= 3332221110 ˆˆˆˆ QDQDQDRateLog iiiiit ρρρρα   
   
( ) ittitii XZQD ελγβρ ++++−∆ 444 ˆ . (2’’) 
 
OLS is used to estimate the equation (2’’), which can be divided into five segments 
according to the value of i∆ˆ : 
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From 0 to 1Q : 
( ) itititiiit XZRateLog εµλγβρα +++++∆+= ˆ0  
From 1Q  to 2Q : 
( ) itititiiit XZQRateLog εµλγβρρρα +++++∆++−= ˆ)()( 1011  
From 2Q  to 3Q : 
( ) itititiiit XZQQRateLog εµλγβρρρρρα +++++∆+++−−= ˆ)()( 2102211  
From 3Q  to 4Q : 
( ) itititiiit XZQQQRateLog εµλγβρρρρρρρα +++++∆++++−−−= ˆ)()( 3210332211  
From 4Q  to the highest value of  i∆ˆ : 
( ) +∆+++++−−−−= iit QQQQRateLog ˆ)()( 4321044332211 ρρρρρρρρρα
 
itititi XZ εµλγβ ++++
 
 
5. Mobility indicators  
 
We incorporate concepts from the literature on job and worker flows to analyze the effect 
of the employer’s wage policy on worker turnover (see, for instance, Burgess, Lane and 
Stevens, 2000 and 2001 or Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996). We use the churning rate of 
the establishment as a measure of excess turnover. For each establishment, we calculate the 
employment change during one year ( itEMP∆ ). It can be either positive or negative, 
alternatively constituting a job creation or job destruction rate. We also calculate the worker 
flow as the sum of hires and separations during the year (WFit). The churning flow is then 
defined as worker flow minus the absolute value of variation in employment. We divide the 
churning flow by the average stock of workers (ASWit) between t-1 and t to obtain the 
churning rate (CRit): 
it
itit
it ASW
EMPWF
CR
∆−
=  
The churning rate is an indicator of worker excess turnover, but it does not enable us to 
distinguish voluntary movements from involuntary ones. To analyze the kind of job flows at 
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play, we further estimate quit rates at the establishment level, i.e., the share of quits out of 
total employment.3 
 
III. The data 
 
1. Data sources 
 
We use data from two different administrative sources available at the INSEE (the French 
national statistical agency) and a survey from the Ministry of Labor (DARES). The first data 
source is the DADS (Déclarations Annuelles de Données sociales), which is a matched 
employer-employee longitudinal data source, constructed from firm reports to the tax 
authority. The second source is another administrative source called FICUS (Fichiers unifiés 
de SUSE, Système Unifié de Statistiques d’Entreprises), which gives measures of 
employment, value-added and other economic outcomes for most French firms. The third 
source is a survey called DMMO-EMMO (Déclarations sur les Mouvements de Main 
d’Œuvre - Enquête sur les Mouvements de Main d’Œuvre), which reports information about 
workers’ entry and exit. Below, we describe both the methods used for extracting variables 
and the matching process. 
The DADS data source includes data on all wage earners employed in private and semi- 
public establishments. The INSEE receives information from the tax authority to produce 
statistics about employment and wages. They compute an exhaustive dataset in which all 
workers and establishments are followed for two years. For each establishment, individual 
wages, employment periods, age, sex and the skill level of the workers are measured very 
precisely. In this article, we use the data for years 2002 to 2005. Each year, the data include 
more than 1.5 million establishments.  
The DMMO-EMMO survey has two components: an exhaustive section for 
establishments with 50 employees or more and a survey for establishments employing 
between 10 and 49 employees. The “Déclarations des Mouvements de Main-d’Œuvre” 
                                                 
3
 Such an indicator simultaneously grasps information on the level of outflows and their 
nature. Given our data, we were able to test distinguishing the two by considering the 
churning flow and a different definition of the quit rate, i.e., the share of quits among 
outflows. Our estimations results were very similar to those reported below, so we chose to 
keep the indicator most used in the literature for comparability reasons. 
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(DMMO) is a monthly survey, whereas the “Enquête sur les Mouvements de Main-d’Œuvre” 
(EMMO) is a quarterly survey. Both surveys measure all workforce movements (entry and 
exit) for a given establishment. For each movement, we know the legal form of the contract 
(fixed-term or open-ended contract), the legal form of the separation (layoffs, quits, 
retirements, etc.) and worker characteristics (sex, qualification, age and tenure). There are 
about 80,000 establishments each quarter, and half of them have 50 employees or more. Each 
quarter, about 900,000 movements take place in and out of these establishments.  
The FICUS dataset (run by the INSEE) computes economic and financial information at 
the firm level. It consists of various economic situation indicators: value-added, capital 
investment, firm’s profits, etc. The data are based on tax report and survey information. Their 
sample encompasses all firms that are subject to the two major tax regimes, i.e., almost the 
entire productive system. The data were collected for the period 2000-2005. For each year, we 
have a sample of approximately 1.5 million firms (with at least one salaried employee).  
 
2. The merging process 
 
We first group the number of worker entries and exits by type of contract at the annual 
level in DMMO-EMMO files. We check that the sum of employment at the beginning of the 
year plus the difference between total entries and total exits by year equals the sum of 
employment at the end of the year. When this is not the case (for 47% of establishments), we 
keep the recalculated variable. The difference between the recalculated variable and the  value 
in the data is usually 1 employee. We only use establishments with all 4 quarters available 
(we lose 16% of our sample). The yearly aggregated DMMO-EMMO files contain 65,000 
establishments on average. The data concern only the private non-farm sector. 
As the DADS files contain information on all workers employed in private and semi 
public establishments in France, the files are grouped by region (there are 22 regions). For 
each year, we aggregate all the workers’ information by establishment, and we merge the 
grouped data with aggregated DMMO-EMMO year by year, imposing the presence of 
establishments in DMMO-EMMO. After merging these two files, we have 56,748 
establishments in 2002, 59,353 in 2003, 60,601 in 2004 and 57,625 in 2005. Then, among 
DMMO, we control for continuous presence by eliminating all establishments missing 
information for one year and present again in the next year: for instance, establishments that 
are present in 2002 and 2004 but not in 2003 are eliminated. We have an unbalanced panel of 
228,511 establishment-years. These establishments correspond to 175,645 firm-years. Last, 
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we use FICUS to get firm economic and financial variables. We introduce information about 
the economic health of the firm to which the establishment belongs. We use information from 
the years 2000 to 2005 to lag these variables. We eliminate extreme values on log wage. After 
these restrictions, the panel contains 184,075 establishment-years, i.e., for each year, we use  
information approximately corresponding to 45,000 establishments with 10 employees or 
more. 
 
3. Control and dependant variables 
 
The dependant variables are taken from the DADS and the DMMO-EMMO. First, the 
DADS data provide information about mean net hourly wages at the establishment level and 
among each skill group. The DMMO-EMMO provides complete information on worker in- 
and out-flows. Combining the two, we calculate the churning rates and the quit rates. 
Xit is a matrix of covariates that can control for compositional changes. We take into 
account three types of covariates: standard characteristics of establishments, economic health 
indicators and workforce structure indicators. The first group of variables encompasses the 
following: a dummy variable indicating the class size of the establishment in terms of the 
number of employees ([1,19], [20,49], [50,249], [250,499], [500 and more]); a dummy 
variable indicating whether the establishment belongs to a financial group; three indicators of 
the economic health of the firm to which the establishment belongs, i.e., the value-added 
variation rate, the apparent labor productivity ratio and a profits rate, calculated as Gross 
Operating Surplus (GOS) divided by the amount of capital investment. We lag these three 
variables by one year and construct dummies for each quintile of their distribution. When 
estimating mobility ratios (churning rate or quit rate), we further control for total employment 
change at the establishment level. We introduce a dummy differentiating the states of stable 
employment, growing and reducing workforce. 
 The set of non-time-varying explanatory variables (Zi matrix) includes the industry 
(captured by dummy variables at two digit levels, NAF16); the region (captured by 22 dummy 
variables) and a dummy variable for firm legal status. Concerning the workforce structure 
indicators, we include, at the establishment level, the share of women, the share of part-time 
workers, the share of unskilled and skilled workers (3 levels), the share of young workers 
(younger than 30) and the share of old workers (50 years old and more). 
All estimations are run on the whole sample and also run separately for different skill 
groups. Consistently with results presented by Martins (2004), Lazear and Shaw (2008) and 
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Lane, Salmon and Spletzer (2007), our estimations of wage effect show that wage premiums 
are coherent among different skill groups: inside an establishment, skill groups’ wage-effects 
are significantly positively correlated. Unsurprisingly, we also see that the closest skill groups 
exhibit the highest correlation coefficients. Studying the link to mobility patterns, we will see 
this similarity in wage premiums among skill groups does not entirely hold in terms of the 
link between wage and excess turnover. 
 
IV. Estimation results 
 
1. The magnitude of churning flows and its link to the wage effect 
 
For 2005, the median churning rate is 0.33 over the whole sample. Considering different 
skill groups, the median churning rate decreases with the skill level (0.27 for low-skilled, 0.17 
for medium-skilled and 0.09 for high-skilled workers). These estimations are in line with 
those reported in the literature for France and other countries. Bassanini and Marianna (2009) 
actually point out that churning flows are similar across countries, whereas worker flows 
display much more variation. 
Table 2 presents estimations of the link between the wage premium and the churning rate 
for the whole sample.4 The first column presents the conditional correlation as estimated by 
equation (2) and the second column presents the estimated coefficient for each segment of 
equation (2’). The second column, showing spline regression estimations, allows potential 
nonlinearities to appear. Most tables in this article have the same format. The estimation for 
the whole sample shows that firms paying high wages have a low churning rate: the estimated 
 is - 0.299. This result upholds the hypothesis that firms utilize their wage policy as a HRM 
tool to stabilize employees. 
The spline regression estimation further shows that this relation is not linear. Figure 1 
shows a straight line illustrating the relation as estimated with OLS, and a curve based on the 
five gradients estimated for each segment with the spline regression. For the first segment, 
i.e., the very low paying firms, the slope is -1.212, indicating that the correlation is very 
strong for these firms. The higher the wage premium, the weaker the relation between the 
wage premium and the churning rate is. The relation is most intense for establishments with 
wage premiums in the first quintile; for the upper quintile, this relation is even positive. Our 
                                                 
4
 Full specifications are available upon request.  
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hypothesis is that from a certain level of compensation, wages are no longer a stabilizing 
device. At this point, stabilizing workers may imply the use of different HRM tools. It is as if 
paying more could even become counter-productive, i.e., associated with higher churning 
rates.  
 
2. The link between wages and churning flows by establishment size 
 
We further address the impact of establishment size on the link between wage premium 
and excess turn-over. We distinguish establishments with fewer than 50 employees from those 
with 50 employees or more. Such a threshold is logical for our dataset (cf. the distinction 
between EMMO and DMMO), but it is also, and more fundamentally, an important threshold 
in French labor law: numerous obligations only apply to firms with over 50 workers. Tables 
3a and 3b present the estimation of the conditional correlation of wage effect and churning 
rates separately for small and large establishments respectively. 
For both types of establishments, the relation is negative and strongly significant (-0.321 
and -0.169 respectively). The OLS estimated coefficient for small establishments is greater in 
magnitude than that for large establishments. Partitioning the relation according to wage 
premium quintiles, we show that this result is actually due to the linearity imposed in OLS 
regressions. In fact, the relation is close to linear for small establishments, whereas it is 
clearly nonlinear for large establishments. Consequently, if the coefficient for the OLS 
estimation in large establishments is small, it is because the correlation is intensely negative 
for low paying firms (with a -2.628 coefficient for the first quintile) and becomes positive in 
the upper part of the distribution (up to 0.434 for the upper quintile). Ultimately, whereas the 
OLS estimation showed a smaller coefficient in large establishments than in small ones, the 
link between wage effect and churning is more intense as we distribute it all along the wage 
distribution. Churning seems more strongly linked to the level of wage premium in large 
establishments, whereas excess turnover has less to do with the wage policy in small ones. 
One interpretation of these results is that there is less scope for wage policy in small 
establishments and workers know it. In large establishments, the threshold at which the 
coefficients are positive and significant is relatively low, i.e., for wage premiums over the 
medium quintile. This result might be the consequence of higher expectations of workers in 
large establishments. These establishments are expected to provide at least meaningful wage 
premiums: if this is not the case, workers will be hard to retain, and when it is the case, it may 
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not be enough to retain them. In large establishments, paying relatively high wages is not 
enough to prevent churning.  
 
3. The link between  wages and churning flows for different skill groups 
 
We now turn to the estimation of the relation between establishment wage effects and 
churning among different skill groups. The relation between wage effect and turnover is 
estimated for the restricted sample of establishments that actually employ each of the three 
types of skill levels (107,975 establishments), as well as for each skill group taken separately.5 
Estimations for the restricted sample are quite close to those for the whole sample (as 
presented in Table 2).6 The spline regression estimation confirms the shape of the relation 
between wage effect and churning rate is an inverted J-curve, yet the relation is closer to a 
linear relation than the previous estimation. 
Tables 4a to 4c show estimation results for the different skill groups. The tables show that  
the negative relation between wages and churning holds for each subgroup taken separately. 
The negative relation between wages and excess turnover appears to be particularly strong for 
low-skilled workers (-1.229) and medium-skilled workers (-0.820), and weaker for high 
skilled ones (-0.121). For the latter, we suspect the range of potential HRM tools aiming at 
stabilizing workers is wider: there is the span of responsibility, and they also have more 
frequent access to training, for example.  
The separate spline regression estimations show that the relation is more intense in high 
paying firms for medium and low-skilled workers, whereas it is more intense in low paying 
firms for high-skilled workers. The estimated coefficients are again systematically lower for 
high-skilled workers – except for firms with very low wage premiums. Estimations are as if 
paying high wages was a necessary and sufficient policy to preserve low- or medium-skilled 
workers inside the establishment but was not enough to stabilize high-skilled workers. For the 
latter, paying low wages exposes the establishment to excess churning, but paying high wages 
is not a guarantee to keeping them. 
 
                                                 
5
 Wage effects for each skill group are calculated over the whole sample (108,972 
establishments). Estimations have also been run with wage-effect separately estimated on 
each skill sub-sample and results are similar. 
6
 Results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
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4. The link between establishment wage effects and the quit rate 
 
Our panel includes information on the legal nature of worker movements. We use this 
information to question the channel through which a firm’s wage policy is associated with 
particular levels of churning rates. Is it the employer’s or the employee’s initiative? Do 
workers leave an establishment more or less frequently depending on its wage policy? This 
leads us to focus on exits and, more specifically, on quits. Table 5 presents the share of 
different types of exits in France over the period 2002-2005. Each year, 16% to 19% of exits 
are attributable to quits. Tables 6 to 8 present estimation results for the link between wage 
policy and quit rates, for the whole sample and for different sub-samples (according to 
establishment size and workers’ skill groups).  
The estimations first show that paying relatively high wages is constantly associated with 
lower quit rates (for example, -0.623 for the whole sample). The conditional correlation is 
negative and significant in almost every specification tested. Employees’ voluntary exit 
moves seem to be linked to the establishment’s wage policy, as if employees do react as 
expected to the employer’s wage stabilization policy. The link between wage premium and 
quit rates is consistent with the hypothesis that workers do act in response to a firm’s 
stabilization policy based on pay levels. As for churning regressions, spline estimations show 
the relation is not linear but takes the shape of an inverted J. Once again, the relation is most 
intense in low-paying establishments, and it is even positive in those paying well over 
average.  
Regarding the differences among establishments of different size, the same gap appears as 
for churning rate. The relation is more intense for large establishments than for small ones, 
and it is more intense for low levels of wage premiums. This result bolters the argument put 
forward when interpreting the link between wage effect and churning according to 
establishment size, i.e., the hypothesis that employees in large establishments expect more 
than wage premiums to be stabilized.  
For all skill groups, the relation is estimated to be negative. For churning rates, the 
relation is more intense the lower the skill.   
Ultimately, we find quite symmetric results for the relation between wage effect and 
churning rates and that between wage effect and quit rates. Our empirical analysis then 
establishes the hypothesis that pay levels constitute an HRM stabilizing policy and that the 
relation involves changes in quit rates. One may argue that quits are the expression of the 
employer’s will as much as the worker’s will; this may be true in some cases. In such cases, 
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we could say the employer is multiplying the tools to favor workers’ exits: low pay and 
motivation to quit. Overall, there is still a high correlation between low-wage premiums and 
high quit rates. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We show that at the establishment level, higher wage premiums are associated with lower 
employee churning rates and quit rates. Our analysis is based on an original longitudinal 
matched employer-employee dataset, which enables us to control for a large set of standard 
characteristics of establishments, economic health indicators and workforce structure 
indicators. Our estimations support the hypothesis that paying higher wages constitutes an 
efficient human resource stabilization policy and that the relation runs through the diminution 
of quit rates.  
More precisely, our findings can be summarized as follows:  
- The relation between wage premium and churning rate or quit rate is not linear along 
the distribution of wage effects. Its shape is an inverted J curve: the relation is 
important and negative for low paying establishments, but it is weaker and even 
becomes positive in the highest paying establishments. This result suggests wages 
were a necessary but not sufficient condition to retain workers.  
- Disaggregating at the level of establishment size, we show such a relation actually 
exists mainly in establishments with 50 workers or more. In the smallest 
establishments (with 10 to 50 workers), the relation is more linear and less intense.  
- The negative relation holds for all skill groups taken separately, but the link is less 
intense as the qualification level increases.  
- The relation between quit rate and wage premium is symmetric to that with churning 
rate: i.e., negative and taking the shape of an inverted J. This result is true for all 
subsamples studied. The statistical relations suggest that workers did react to the 
establishment’s wage policy in their decision to quit. 
Our estimation method cannot rule out the hypothesis that the correlation is the 
consequence of a selection bias rather than a wage policy. High wage premiums may also be 
the consequence of a bias in workers’ unobservable characteristics. We may imagine a 
particular type of worker, those with high-paying unobserved characteristics, would group 
into some firms and be less mobile. Yet, the existing empirical literature on the ‘assortative 
matching’ of firms and workers casts doubts on the validity of the selection bias hypothesis. 
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As far as firm and worker wages effects can be disentangled, the literature finds a small or 
negative correlation between the two, meaning that in fact, our establishment wage effects are 
potentially underestimated. In this context, our interpretation in terms of stabilization policy is 
particularly plausible.  
In many aspects, our analysis opens the way to future research. First, it would be 
interesting to develop a parallel analysis for establishments with fewer than 10 employees. 
There are thousands of small establishments (in which the turnover rate is high), and we 
would like to know whether the wage policy of the employer affects worker mobility in the 
same way. Using Finnish data, Barth and Dale-Olsen (1999) find there is no effect of wage 
policy on the turnover in very small establishments, but such results still have to be tested in 
the French case. Second, in recent years, better access to international databases has opened 
the way to cross-national comparison of job flows, worker flows and the way they interact 
(Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2009, Haltiwanger, Schweiger and Scarpetta, 2010, 
Bassanini and Marianna, 2009, Centeno, Machado and Novo, 2009). This may allow a 
comparative analysis of the link between these flows and the wage policies of firms. Such an 
analysis would address the question of the role of an establishment’s characteristics in 
explaining national specificities. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES   
 
 
 
TABLE 1. – Transition matrix for establishment wage effects 
 
                  Base year decile 
  
 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6st 7th 8th 9th 10th 
2002 to 2005 76.8 66.8 60.4 53.2 49.2 51.2 52.6 60.3 71.3 78.8 
2002 to 2003 84.0 75.1 66.7 63.4 59.7 62.7 66.1 70.8 79.7 87.3 
2003 to 2004 87.9 79.7 72.5 68.4 66.2 65.9 68.9 74.4 81.7 84.4 
2004 to 2005 86.3 79.9 72.2 64.9 63.0 62.1 68.0 72.3 78.8 84.3 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. – Wage premium and churning rate 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.299 ***   
 (0.014)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -1,212 *** 
2nd  -1,215  
3rd  -0.785 ** 
4th  -0.224 *** 
5th  0.358 *** 
Observations 151,361 151,361 
Censored observations 14,558 14,558 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee),  
2002 to 2005. 
Notes: numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels. Coefficients of the spline regression are calculated as the 
gradient of each segment. Significance level refers to the 
estimated coefficient. Only the first estimate corresponds to the 
significance of the gradient; for all succeeding estimates, it tests 
the significance of the difference between the gradient of a 
segment and that of the previous one.  
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TABLE 3a. – Wage premium and churning rate by establishment size: 
small establishments (10 to 50 workers) 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.321 ***   
 (0.018)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -0.507 *** 
2nd  -0.690  
3rd  -0.381  
4th  -0.184  
5th  0.312 *** 
Observations 80,607 80,607 
Censored observations 13,503 13,503 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 
2005. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3b. – Wage premium and churning rate by establishment size: 
large establishments (more than 50 workers) 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.169 ***   
 (0.020)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -2.628 *** 
2nd  -0.816 *** 
3rd  -0.739  
4th  0.375 *** 
5th  0.434  
Observations 70,754 70,754 
Censored observations 1,055 1,055 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 
to 2005. 
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TABLE 4a. – Wage premium and churning rate by skill level: low-skilled workers 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -1.229 ***   
 (0.034)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -1.113 *** 
2nd  -1.866 ** 
3rd  -2.597 * 
4th  -1.527 *** 
5th  0.103 *** 
Observations 107,975 107,975 
Censored observations 45,645 45,645 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 
2002 to 2005. 
 
TABLE 4b. – Wage premium and the churning rate by skill level: medium-skilled workers 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.820 ***   
 (0.027)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -1.751 *** 
2nd  -1.426  
3rd  -1.136  
4th  -2.132 *** 
5th  1.037 *** 
Observations 107,975 107,975 
Censored observations 33,236 33,236 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 
2002 to 2005. 
 
TABLE 4c. – Wage premium and churning rate by skill level: high-skilled workers 
Dependant variable: log (churning rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.121 ***   
 (0.015)    
Wage premium quintiles     
1st  -2.005 *** 
2nd  -0.344 *** 
3rd  -0.861 *** 
4th  -0.392 *** 
5th  0.657 *** 
Observations 107,975 107,975 
Censored observations 50,252 50,252 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 
2002 to 2005. 
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TABLE 5. – Legal forms of exits 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Ending fixed term contract 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56 
Layoffs 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Quits 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 
Other 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS 
(Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6. – Wage premium and quit rate 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.623 ***   
 (0.014)    
Wage premium 
quintiles     
1st  -2.178 *** 
2nd  -1.734 *** 
3rd  -1.479  
4th  -0.718 *** 
5th  0.474 *** 
Observations 151,361 151,361 
Censored 
observations 33,611 33,611 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS 
(Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7a. – Wage premium and quit rate by establishment size: 
small establishments (10 to 50 workers) 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.300 ***   
 (0.017)    
Wage premium 
quintiles     
1st  -0.541 *** 
2nd  -0.478  
3rd  -0.662  
4th  -0.382  
5th  0.006 *** 
Observations 80,607 80,607 
Censored observations 27,031 27,031 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS 
(Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
 Workshop on job and worker flows, 15-16 November 2012, Kyoto University 
 
 
TABLE 7b. – Wage premium and quit rate by establishment size: 
large establishments (more than 50 workers) 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 
  
OLS 
regression 
Spline 
regression 
Wage premium -0.519 ***   
 (0.019)    
Wage premium 
quintiles     
1st  -2.761 *** 
2nd  -1.650 *** 
3rd  -0.589  
4th  -0,586  
5th  0.289 *** 
Observations 70,754 70,754 
Censored observations 6,580 6,580 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS 
(Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
 
 
TABLE 8a. – Wage premium and quit rate by skill level: low-skilled workers 
 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 

OLS  
Regression 
Spline  
regression 
Wage premium -1.270 *** 
  
 
(0.037) 
  
Wage premium 
quintiles 
  
  
1st 
  
-1.681 *** 
2nd 
  
-3.716 *** 
3rd 
  
-1.635 *** 
4th 
  
-2.198 
 
5th 
  
1.733 *** 
Observations 
108,997 108,997
Censored 
observations 
64,284 
 
64,284 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 
2002 to 2005. 
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TABLE 8b. – Wage premium and quit rate by skill level: medium-skilled workers 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 
 
 
OLS  
regression 
Spline  
regression 
Wage premium -1.191 *** 
  
 
(0.029) 
 
  
Wage premium quintiles 
  
  
1st 
  
-3.209 *** 
2nd 
  
-1.874 *** 
3rd 
  
-1.171 ** 
4th 
  
-2.961 *** 
5th 
  
1.420 *** 
Observations 108,997 
 
108,997 
 
Censored observations 52,199 
 
52,199 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 
to 2005. 
 
TABLE 8c. – Wage premium and quit rate by skill level: high-skilled workers 
Dependant variable: log (quit rate) 
 
 
OLS  
regression 
Spline  
regression 
Wage premium -0.275 *** 
  
 
(0.017) 
 
  
Wage premium quintiles 
  
  
1st 
  
-2.457 *** 
2nd 
  
-0.382 *** 
3rd 
  
-1.070 *** 
4th 
  
-1.099 
 
5th 
  
0.674 *** 
Observations 108,997 
 
108,997 
 
Censored observations 64,806 
 
64,806 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 
to 2005. 
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FIGURE 1. – Wage premium and churning rate. 
 OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve) 
  
 
             Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross the 
spline curve at the second quintile. 
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FIGURE 2 – Wage premium and churning rate by establishment size. 
OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve)  
 
 
 
      Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross 
the spline curve at the second quintile. 
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FIGURE 3. – Wage premium and churning rate by skill level: a graphic representation  
Simple OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve) 
 
 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross 
the spline curve at the second quintile. 
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FIGURE 4. – Wage premium and quit rate 
OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve) 
 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross 
the spline curve at the second quintile. 
  




	







  	   

C
F
D


F
E



FDFCFECFEF
 Workshop on job and worker flows, 15-16 November 2012, Kyoto University 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5. – Wage premium and quit rate by establishment size. 
OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross 
the spline curve at the second quintile. 
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FIGURE 6. – Wage premium and quit rate by skill level. 
OLS (straight line) and Spline Regression (curve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DMMO-EMMO (Dares), DADS and FICUS (Insee), 2002 to 2005. 
Notes: the plain curve illustrates the spline regression estimation. In the 
figure, the intercept is forced to take the value of 100. The spotted line 
illustrates the OLS estimation. In the figure, the line is forced to cross 
the spline curve at the second quintile. 
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